A consistent bargaining set
作者： Bhaskar Dutta , Debraj Ray , Kunal Sengupta , Rajiv Vohra
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90069-0
关键词:
摘要: Abstract Both the core and bargaining set fail to satisfy a natural requirement of consistency. In excluding imputations which there exist objections, does not assess “credibility” such objections. The goes step further. Only objections have no counterobjections are considered justified. However, credibility is similarly assessed. We formulate notion consistent in each objection “chain” tested precisely same way as its predecessor. Various properties also analyzed.
elsevier.com
sci-hub.se 参考文章(8)
Robert J. Aumann, Michael Maschler, THE BARGAINING SET FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES ,(1961)
M. Maschler, B. Peleg, L. S. Shapley, The kernel and bargaining set for convex games International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 1, pp. 73- 93 ,(1971) , 10.1007/BF01753435
D. Ray, Credible coalitions and the core International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 18, pp. 185- 187 ,(1989) , 10.1007/BF01268157
Morton Davis, Michael Maschler, The kernel of a cooperative game Naval Research Logistics Quarterly. ,vol. 12, pp. 223- 259 ,(1965) , 10.1002/NAV.3800120303
Bezalel Peleg, A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution Mathematical Social Sciences. ,vol. 11, pp. 83- 87 ,(1986) , 10.1016/0165-4896(86)90006-5
W. W. Sharkey, Convex games without side payments International Journal of Game Theory. ,vol. 10, pp. 101- 106 ,(1981) , 10.1007/BF01769263
Andreu Mas-Colell, An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set Journal of Mathematical Economics. ,vol. 18, pp. 129- 139 ,(1989) , 10.1016/0304-4068(89)90017-7
8. An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set Harvard University Press. ,(2016) , 10.4159/9780674915343-009