Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets

摘要: Since it is the task of a discussant to find weak spots and gaps in paper, let me stress that I enjoyed reading Weingast's [1993] paper. It restates clearly some problems relationships which have been well-known for long time tries look at them from fresh perspective. The references are comprehensive though they overemphasize contributions by Riker his students, since omit much other earlier work Public Choice Theorists Political Scientists. result majority rule has no natural equilibrium or stable policy (Weingast [1993, 289]), e.g., related logrolling, can be generalized interpreted as substantive interpretation Arrow's impossibility theorem (Bernholz [1980]). But most authors who did original field not mentioned (Muller [1979, esp. 49-58] Muller [1989, 82-95]).