摘要: We consider discounted stochastic games characterized by monotonicity, supermodularity and diagonal dominance assumptions on the reward functions transition law. A thorough novel discussion of scope limitations this class is provided. Existence a Markov-stationary equilibrium for infinite-horizon game, proved Curtat (1996), summarized. Uniqueness Markov solvability finite-horizon game are established. In both cases, strategies corresponding value nondecreasing Liptschitz-continuous state vector. Some specific economic applications discussed.
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