Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
作者： Kenneth G Binmore , Larry Samuelson
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I
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摘要: We consider a game in which “meta-players” choose finite automata to play repeated stage game. Meta-players' utilities are lexicographic, first increasing the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs of and second decreasing number states their automaton. examine outcomes this satisfy version evolutionary stability that has been modified permit existence. find such must be efficient, they maximize sum from
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