Optimal decisions and Pareto improvement for green supply chain considering reciprocity and cost-sharing contract.

作者: Xiao-Min Gong , Man Yang

DOI: 10.1007/S11356-021-12752-W

关键词:

摘要: With the rapid development of green consumption demand, more and consumers choose to purchase products. Incorporating consumers' environmental awareness into a supply chain, this paper studies decisions coordination chain under retailer's reciprocal preference. The decentralized models with without reciprocity are constructed analyzed consideration product degree pricing. Then, cost-sharing joint commission contract is proposed realize Pareto improvement. Finally, propositions conclusions verified by numerical simulation. results indicate that improving favorable profit whole environment. Besides, within reasonable range preference, higher value preference conductive better realization protection improvement economic welfare society. exerts positive effect in performance (GSC). provides theoretical foundation for design cooperative contracts GSC, especially GSC

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