摘要: THIS ARTICLE critically reviews the Handbook of Industrial Organization (henceforward "Handbook"), edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig. These two volumes are tenth installment in North-Holland Handbooks Economics series, under general editorship Kenneth Arrow Michael Intriligator. Like its predecessors, this contains a number survey papers (in instance, 26) on variety related topics. As such, they afford both authors readers an opportunity to determine which directions research field has taken, what (if any) real advances have been made, questions still unanswered. Consequently, review also describes appraises current state Organization. Research undergone dramatic change last 20 years. Neoclassical decision-theoretic analysis competitive equilibrium theory supplanted almost completely noncooperative game theory. This was not merely adoption tools another field.
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