Democracy and public choice : essays in honor of Gordon Tullock

摘要: PART I ON METHOD: The Qualities of a Natural Economie, James M. Buchanan (George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia) Economist or Popperian Logician?, Charles K. Rowley Gordon Tullock as Rhetorical Economist, Richard E. Wagner (Florida State Tallahassee, Florida) II THE ORIGINAL INSIGHT: Calculus Consent, and Peter H. Aranson (Emory Atlanta, Georgia) Consent - Notes in Retrospection, William C. Mitchell (University Oregon, Eugene, Oregon) III VOTE MOTIVE: Voting Paradox, Dennis Mueller Maryland, College Park, Maryland) Robustness the Plott (California Institute Technology, Pasadena, California) Parchment, Guns, Maintenance Constitutional Contrast, Public Choices Public, Arthur Seldon (The Economic Affairs, Westminster, London) Bureaucracy, A. Niskanen Cato Institute, Washington, D.C.) V RENT SEEKING: Is Theory Rent Seeking Here to Stay?,Robert D. Tollison is Stay, Michael Crew (Rutgers Newark, New Jersey) Institutional Economics, Douglass North (Washington St. Louis, Missouri) VI LAW: Choice Law Paradox Tullock, J. Goetz Virginia, Charlottesville, Inefficiency Common Law, Susan Rose-Ackerman (Columbia York) Logic Revisited, Warren F. Schwartz (Georgetown REFORM OF INSTITUTIONS: Why Some Welfare, Redistribution Poor Great Idea, Mancur Olson A Political Economy Budget Deficits, Margaret Monaco