摘要: The fact that different agricultural policy mechanisms have emerged for commodities suggests the choice of instrument may reflect goals makers. This paper uses principles mechanism design under asymmetric information to examine motivations underlying mechanisms. It is found supply control favor high-cost producers and budget, while resulting in overproduction low-cost producers.
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