Altruism as a Signal: Zahavi's Alternative to Kin Selection and Reciprocity

摘要: Zahavi (1995) refutes the logic of kin selection and reciprocity, proposes an alternative signalling explanation for evolution altruism. This paper expands upon Zahavi's promising "altruism as a handicap" argument, in which "altruists" improve their future fitness result honestly phenotypic quality to prospective mates or allies. It is suggested that cooperative systems may be especially likely evolve signals using altruism handicap, because costs could recouped within collaboration (e.g. mate choice based on courtship feeding also increases female reproductive output). However, claim inherent helping-at-thenest has evolved enhance "social prestige" helpers group seems unlikely basis current evidence. The utility concept social prestige questionable, particularly when compared related overlapping ideas already use, concerning dominance, reciprocity affiliative behaviour. In order generate need hypothesis, misleading arguments have been presented similarities between selection, evolutionary stability cooperation reciprocation. confusion rather unnecessary, signal compatible with these other well-established theories. Further work now required form mathematical game theory models explore signal.