Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders

摘要: In my dissertation, I investigate the effects of budget-constraints in multi-unit auctions. This is done three parts. First, analyze a case where all bidders have common budget constraint. Precisely, an auction two units object are sold at simultaneous, sealed bid, first-price auctions, to who demand for both units. Bidders differ with respect their valuations All identical constraint which binds ability spend auction. show that if valuation distribution atom-less, then does not exist any symmetric equilibrium this game. second and third parts thesis, sale licenses right drill oil natural gas Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) United States. These sales conducted using simultaneous sealed-bid auctions multiple licenses, each representing specific area (called tract). Using aspects observed bidding-behavior, first make prima facie budget-constrained these order formalize argument, develop simple extension standard model (where objects) by incorporating (random) budgets bidders. The auction-game has two-dimensional set types player. study theoretical properties auction, assuming simplicity being sold. game pure strategies players essentially sense