Elite CEOs: Impact on Compensation and Firm Performance Models
作者： Mark J. Pate
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摘要: A particular body of research examines the issue linking executive pay to firm performance by focusing on observation that CEO compensation varies widely across firms, even within same industry. This assumes model (i.e., structure model, explanatory variables, and coefficients those variables) can be applied all CEOs. If you will, extant a one-sizefits-all approach empirical analysis. Furthermore, much this also similarly utilizes one-size-fits-all model. I develop proxy for managerial power use rank classify CEOs into two groups: Elite (above cut-off ranking) NonElite (the remaining CEOs). As note, demonstrate ranking my is not as simply their total direct compensation. My results show rejected. That is, estimated in models are different compared Non-Elite Also, firms with do have higher performance. suggests extract excessive due undue influence over respective boards rather than superior These findings both academic corporate policy
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