摘要: This paper extends the traditional “pivoting” and “swing” schemes in Shapley–Shubik (S-S) power index Banzhaf to case of “blocking”. Voters are divided into two groups: those who vote for bill against bill. The uncertainty division is described by a probability distribution. We derive S-S index, based on priori ignorance about random bipartition.
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