Normative Self-Constitution and Individual Autonomy

摘要: Many trenchant moral and political issues turn on the question of whether values, commitments, desires are considered essential to identity persons—that is, they must be seen as internal self. The central thesis paper is that normative commitments are, in fact, agency I attempt defend this position by sketching a model self meant function theory individual autonomy. It my contention understanding separable from such stems, part, failure differentiate Me-self I-Self (using terminology developed William James). former contains aspects can object introspective appraisal. Such factors form our self-image, but elements we bring mind contemplate. I-self, however, refers agentic consciousness itself, functioning processes judgment which operate according norms values orient variety ways. Seen way, structure way guides reflective introspection itself. difficulty arises, plagues discussions autonomy many contexts, agents interact social settings where asked justify their each other (often part social, democratic forms deliberation), including justification those partly constitute (I-self) identities. suggest an account serve purposes interpersonal reason-giving while remaining consistent with (autonomous) selves constituted commitments.