Why electoral systems don’t always matter: The impact of “Mega-seats” on legislative behavior

作者: Shane G. Martin

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摘要: A significant and influential body of research suggests that electoral systems influence legislators’ behavior. Yet, empirical frequently fails to uncover the existence such a relationship. This study offers potential solution: The core suggestion is mechanisms by which prized post-election positions (mega-seats) are distributed within legislature impacts legislative When party leaders cartelize allocation mega-seats, anticipated effects system on behavior may dissolve. Ireland’s candidate-centered party-controlled mega-seat provides for hard test argument. New data mega-seats voting in Irish parliament between 1980 2010 supports notion considerations rather than shapes roll-call implication what goes be more important influencing at ballot box. observation resolve puzzle why do not always exert their purported influence.

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