The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling
作者： Ken Binmore , Asher Wolinsky , Asher Wolinsky , Ariel Rubinstein
DOI:
关键词:
摘要: This article establishes the relationship between static axiomatic theory of bargaining and sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two models alternating offers. The differ in source incentive parties reach agreement: bargainers' time preference risk breakdown negotiations. Each has a unique perfect equilibrium. When motivation agreement is made negligible, each model equilibrium outcome approaches Nash solution with utilities that reflect settle proper disagreement point chosen. results provide guide for application economic modelling.
jstor.org 参考文章(11)
A. E. Roth, R. Kihlstrom, D. Schmeidler, Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem ,(1981)
Alvin E. Roth, Axiomatic models of bargaining ,(1979)
H Moulin, Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution Journal of Economic Theory. ,vol. 33, pp. 32- 45 ,(1984) , 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90038-3
Vincent P. Crawford, A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining Econometrica. ,vol. 50, pp. 607- 637 ,(1982) , 10.2307/1912604
John Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games Econometrica. ,vol. 21, pp. 128- 140 ,(1953) , 10.2307/1906951
Paul A. Grout, Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts: A Nash Bargaining Approach Econometrica. ,vol. 52, pp. 449- 460 ,(1984) , 10.2307/1911498
Thomas Crombie Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict ,(1960)
Christopher J. Ellis, John Fender, Wage Bargaining in a Macroeconomic Model with Rationing Quarterly Journal of Economics. ,vol. 100, pp. 625- 650 ,(1985) , 10.2307/1884372
Avner Shaked, John Sutton, INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT AS A PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM IN A BARGAINING MODEL Econometrica. ,vol. 52, pp. 1351- 1364 ,(1984) , 10.2307/1913509
Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree Annals of Statistics. ,vol. 4, pp. 1236- 1239 ,(1976) , 10.1214/AOS/1176343654