Optimal Iterative Pricing with Positive Network Externalities

摘要: In this paper, we study optimal pricing for revenue maximization in the presence of positive network externalities. our model, value a digital good buyer is function set buyers who have already bought item. setting, buyer’s decision to buy an item depends on price as well other that own The problem context social networks has been initiated by Hartline, Mirrokni, and Sundararajan [6], following previous line research viral marketing strategies [7, 9]. contrast work Hartline et. al. without discrimination. particular, iterative models which seller iteratively posts (visible all buyers), interested can at price. We consider Bayesian setting some prior (probability distribution) valuations buyers. two allow difierent rates re-pricing: case are allowed re-price very frequently, show inapproximable even simple deterministic valuation functions, light hardness result, present constant logarithmic approximation algorithms special with identical individual distributions. On hand, second model only limited rate, give FPTAS strategy general case.