A Little Bit Louder Now: Signaling, Interests, and the Liberal Peace.

摘要: This dissertation examines competing explanations for the liberal peace (the idea that trade between states creates pacific relations those states) and uses statistical analysis to argue traditional "interest-based" (Russett Oneal, 2001) do not explain aspects of interstate conflicts as well more recent "signaling-based" (Fearon, 1994; Gartzke et. al., 2001). Specifically, probabilities conflict when a measure whether one state is economically dependent on other included. The results suggest are likely both initiate use higher levels hostility in ongoing than non-dependent states. These results, I argue, consistent with signaling-based peace, wholly inconsistent interest-based explanations. Additionally, by examining actions states, looks at set boundary conditions (Mansfield Pollins, establishing limits peace. Next, argues two dominant data sets used study (Gleditsch, 2002; Barbieri, 2002) flawed: Gleditsch biased GDP measures Barbieri missing values. Finally, existence itself called into question: empirical tests indicate amounts specific trading partners lead greater probability initiating using ensuing partner.