Denial and Disagreement

摘要: We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with assertion of $$A$$ denying . show that, if denial is to serve as a means disagreement, it must be exclusive, in sense being correct only what denied false only. Hence, can’t expressed theorist’s language, essentially for same reasons why Boolean negation such language either. then turn an alternative proposal, defended Beall (in Analysis 73(3):438–445, 2013; Rev Symb Log, 2014), expressing truth and falsity only, hence disagreement. According this, exclusive semantic status , either true or can conveyed adding one’s theory shrieking rule form $$A \wedge \lnot A \vdash \bot $$ where $$\bot entails triviality. argue, however, proposal doesn’t work The upshot face dilemma: they denial, but not both. Along way, we offer bilateral logic theorists—an extension commonly called $$\mathsf {LP}$$