Cronyism as an outcome of institutional settings: the case of pre-2011 Egypt

摘要: Why are state business relations in Egypt characterized by widely acknowledged high levels of cronyism? The purpose this paper is to investigate the institutional factors explaining research question with a focus on pre-2011 Egypt.,Based general theoretical discussion, certain institutions were proposed as being responsible. A game model then introduced. It explains why cronyism was best strategy for various players contrast aggregating and lobbying their efforts obtain government available resources, whether these resources energy subsidies, public banks’ credit or regulations. Then discussed case study. This discussion enriched literature empirical data.,Choosing attributed presence weak dependent private sector, where businesspeople unable aggregate power; relatively stronger government; poor governance performance; higher regime legitimization practices, such providing generous consumer subsidies; economic growth caused an increase rather than improvement. data Egypt, going over factors, helped support arguments.,Further evidence needed modify suggestions paper. More detailed indicators would have further research. Moreover, more studies, other also needed. hoped that encourage endeavors cover limitations.,Governance reform minimize cronyism, especially voice accountability, rule law, regulatory quality control corruption.,This can explain witnessed many countries world, including Middle East North Africa (MENA). region shares Egypt. Governments MENA sources power regard sectors added performance region.,The deep analysis conducted causes Cronyism has not been done elsewhere. true whole region. introduced first trial sort should be important future works topic developing countries.