Optimal Contract, Ownership Structure and Asset Pricing

作者: Qi Zeng , Hae Won

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摘要: This paper studies a dynamic equilibrium asset pricing model with managerial moral hazard. A representative, all-equity rm is owned by two separate types of constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) investors|a large shareholder and continuum small shareholders. The holds long-term view trades infrequently. From her controlling equity stake in the rm, plays dominant role hiring manager implementing compensation scheme. Small dispersed competitive shareholders, however, trade shares continuously. We obtain closed-form solution that characterizes rm’s ownership struc

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