Patents, Papers, Pairs & Secrets: Contracting over the disclosure of scientific knowledge *

摘要: Motivated by the central role of voluntary knowledge disclosure in ensuring cumulative progress, this paper evaluates conditions supporting privately funded new through scientific publication, patenting, or both. We ground our analysis incentives facing researchers and their funders: scientists have to disclose discoveries while firms protect ideas patenting secrecy. When negotiating compensation, bargain over whether (and how) will be disclosed. evaluate four different regimes: secrecy, commercial science (where only disclosures result from patenting), open occur publication) patent-paper pairs firm discloses along both dimensions). Our model derives under which each these outcomes emerges as strategic interaction between research funders, offers a number novel insights into determinants strategy firm. Among other findings, highlights subtle interdependency publication: for example, required publication converge, we observe either secrecy pairs, exclusion uni-dimensional (i.e., Commercial Science Open Science). Journal Economic Literature Classification Number: O34.