Institutional Investors, Equity Incentive and Executive Compensation: An Empirical Study Based on Conflict of Interest

作者: Qingfeng Cai , Jiao Chen , Jianbo Lin

DOI: 10.1109/CISE.2009.5362717

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参考文章(17)
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