Alternative ways to decouple electric utility revenues from sales
作者： Eric Hirst , Eric Blank , David Moskovitz
DOI: 10.1016/1040-6190(94)90185-6
关键词:
摘要: Abstract Decoupling approaches have the flexibility to be combined with various types of incentive regulation. For example, instead price-cap regulation, which would penalize a utility for running DSM programs, revenue-cap regulation encourage utilities innovative and aggressive in their cost cutting, while ensuring that shareholders are rewarded cost-effective programs.
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(5)
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