作者: Saurabh Panjwani
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_2
关键词:
摘要: We prove a computational soundness theorem for symmetric-key encryption protocols that can be used to analyze security against adaptively corrupting adversaries (that is, who corrupt protocol participants during execution). Our shows if the scheme in is semantically secure, and cycles are absent, then adaptive corruptions achievable via reduction factor of O(n ċ (2n)l), with n l being (respectively) size depth key graph generated any execution. Since, most practical interest, graphs (measured as longest chain ciphertexts form Ɛk1 (k2), Ɛk2 (k3), Ɛk3 (k4), ...) much smaller than their (the total number keys), this gives us powerful tool argue about such protocols, without resorting non-standard techniques (like non-committing encryption). We apply our analysis multicast show variant Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) secure (its quasi-polynomially related underlying scheme).