Efficiency and Equity in the EU Burden Sharing Agreement
作者： Jan Cornillie , Johan Eyckmans , Denise Van Regemorter
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摘要: In this paper we investigate the EU Burden Sharing Agreement on distribution of Kyoto emission reduction target over member states. We use an inverse welfare optimum approach to compute implicit weights making a for EU. This methodology enables us visualise efficiencyequity trade off which was made by negotiators. present simulations based marginal carbon abatement cost curves estimated data generated GEM-E3 Europe general equilibrium model. Our reveal that improves in terms efficiency upon uniform assignment but substantial differences costs persist. Some poorer states like Portugal and Spain have been allowed agreement increase their emissions considerably but, even if do not care about distributional justice, allowances are too low according approach. Also Sweden, Netherlands Belgium should abate less order improve efficiency. On other hand, Germany, UK, France Denmark curb more than what has assigned them Agreement. show introducing measure inequality aversion reinforces most these conclusions. also apply scenario allow trading, possibly with market power. Sensitivity analysis shows results rather robust respect assumptions concerning baseline functions.
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