Should the Model for Risk‐Informed Regulation be Game Theory Rather than Decision Theory?

摘要: Risk analysts frequently view the regulation of risks as being largely a matter decision theory. According to this view, risk analysis methods provide information on likelihood and severity various possible outcomes; should then be assessed using decision-theoretic approach (such cost/benefit analysis) determine whether are acceptable, additional is warranted. However, ignores fact that in many industries (particularly technologically sophisticated employ specialized safety experts), analyses may done by regulated firms, not regulator. Moreover, those firms have more knowledge about levels at their own facilities than regulator does. This creates situation which firm has both opportunity-and often also motive-to inaccurate (in particular, favorably biased) regulator, hence reason doubt accuracy provided parties. Researchers argued theory capable dealing with such strategic interactions well game can. especially true two-player, two-stage games follower unique best strategy response leader's strategy, appears case analyzed article. even cases, we agree Cox game-theoretic concepts can still useful. In tools mechanism design, revelation principle, simplify because principle provides rigorous assurance it sufficient analyze only licensees truthfully report levels, making problem manageable. Without that, would generally necessary consider much complicated forms behavior (including deception), identify optimal regulatory strategies. Therefore, believe types article better modeled rather goals review relevant literature economics (to stimulate interest area among analysts), present illustrative results showing how application useful insights into practice risk-informed regulation.