Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
作者： David P. Baron , David Besanko
DOI: 10.2307/2555518
关键词:
摘要: … of a regulated firm that is better informed about its cost function … of a regulated firm and to the monitoring of performance … about the firm's technology and the components of its cost. The …
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sci-hub.se 参考文章(21)
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