Strategic Ownership Structure and the Cost of Debt

作者: Hadiye Aslan , Praveen Kumar

DOI: 10.1093/RFS/HHS062

关键词:

摘要: We theoretically and empirically address the endogeneity of corporate ownership structure cost debt, with a novel emphasis on role control concentration in postdefault firm restructuring. Control raises agency costs dominant shareholders trade off private benefits against higher borrowing choosing their stakes. Based our theoretical predictions, using an international sample syndicated loans unique dynamic data, we present new evidence firm- macro-level determinants debt. (JEL G21, G32)

参考文章(88)
Manju Puri, Steven Drucker, Banks in Capital Markets: A Survey Social Science Research Network. ,(2006)
Milton Harris, Artur Raviv, Corporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules Journal of Financial Economics. ,vol. 20, pp. 203- 235 ,(1988) , 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90045-1
Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, Take-Over Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science. ,vol. 11, pp. 42- 64 ,(1980) , 10.2307/3003400
Andrew Weiss, Joseph E. Stiglitz, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. The American Economic Review. ,vol. 71, pp. 393- 410 ,(1981) , 10.7916/D8V12FT1
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control Social Science Research Network. ,(1999) , 10.3386/W7203
Marcel G. Dagenais, Denyse L. Dagenais, Higher moment estimators for linear regression models with errors in the variables Journal of Econometrics. ,vol. 76, pp. 193- 221 ,(1997) , 10.1016/0304-4076(95)01789-5
Alessandro Gavazza, The Role of Trading Frictions in Real Asset Markets The American Economic Review. ,vol. 101, pp. 1106- 1143 ,(2011) , 10.1257/AER.101.4.1106
Oliver D. Hart, A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of Human Capital Social Science Research Network. ,(1991)