Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games

作者: Maria Montero , Alex Possajennikov , Martin Sefton , Theodore L. Turocy

DOI: 10.1007/S00199-015-0902-Y

关键词:

摘要: We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by player who allocates most to that battlefield. The wins with highest total value receives constant winner payoff, while other loser payoff. focus on apex games, there one large and several small A if he any battlefield, or all For each games we study, compute an equilibrium show certain properties play are same equilibrium. In particular, expected share allocated exceeds its relative battlefields, high probability (exceeding 90% our treatments) resources spread over more than needed win game. laboratory experiment, find strategies widely played frequently, consistent predictions. treatment where asymmetry between strongest, also average proportional resources. control treatment, findings previous experimental games.

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