Maya: Falsifying Power Sidechannels with Dynamic Control
作者： Petros Voulgaris , Alexander Schwing , Josep Torrellas , Raghavendra Pradyumna Pothukuchi , Sweta Yamini Pothukuchi
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摘要: The security of computers is at risk because information leaking through physical outputs such as power, temperature, or electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Attackers can use advanced signal measurement and analysis to recover sensitive data from these sidechannels. To address this problem, paper presents Maya, a simple effective solution against power side-channels. idea re-shape the dissipated by an application in application-transparent manner using control theory techniques - preventing attackers learning any information. With theory, controller reliably keep close desired target value even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. Then, changing targets intelligently, be made appear form, appearing carry activity which, reality, unrelated application. Maya implemented privileged software hardware. In paper, we implement on two multiprocessor machines Operating System (OS) threads, show its effectiveness ease deployment.
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harvard.edu参考文章(43)
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