A Collision-Attack on AES Combining Side Channel- and Differential-Attack

摘要: Recently a new class of collision attacks which was originally suggested by Hans Dobbertin has been introduced. These use side channel analysis to detect internal collisions and are generally not restricted particular cryptographic algorithm. As an exam- ple, attack against DES proposed combines with information leakage. It had obvious, however, how this applies non-Feistel ciphers bijective S-boxes such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This contribution takes same basic ideas develops optimized AES. Our major finding is that combined analytical approach reduces effort compared all other known attacks. We develop several versions refinements attack. First we show key dependent can be caused in output bytes mix column transformation first round. By taking advantage birthday paradox, it possible cause little 20 measurements. If SPA leak present from determined certainty, then each will reveal at least 8 bits secret key. Furthermore, attack, four average only 31 measurements, results knowledge 32 bits. Finally, if columns AES parallel, determine entire 128-bit 40 distinct improvement DPA