摘要: Based on recent developments in non-cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, present basic results the random-proposer model apply them to problem involuntary unemployment a labour market. discuss extensions cooperative games with externalities incomplete information. Next, consider enforceability an agreement as institutional foundation cooperation. re-examine contractarian approach from viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create enforcement
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