Equilibrium vertical foreclosure
作者： Steven C. Salop , Garth Saloner , Janusz A. Ordover
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摘要: We formulate a complete, but analytically simple, equilibrium model of vertical mergers to evaluate the logic standard foreclosure claims and criticisms made those claims. The includes incentives integrated firm unintegrated input suppliers exclude rivals, potential counterstrategies competitors these threats, holdout problem. In this fully specified model, can emerge in equilibrium. (JEL 610)
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