摘要: The main contribution of this paper is to present a new procedure reach cooperation through pseudorandom schemes in the finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, when strategies are implemented by automata. equilibrium path consists communication process followed coordinated play. choice set messages efficient since it minimum with respect whole coordination procedure. This allows us outcomes automata complexity lying between ones already offered literature.
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