Preference and strategy in proposer’s prosocial giving in the ultimatum game

摘要: The accumulation of findings that most responders in the ultimatum game reject unfair offers provides evidence humans are driven by social preferences such as for fairness and prosociality. On other hand, if how proposer's behavior is affected remains unelucidated. We addressed this question first time manipulating knowledge proposer had about responder's belief concerning intentionality proposer. In a new called "ultimatum with ambiguous intentions (UGAMB)," we made to recipient. expected found would make more than standard game. This expectation can be derived from either preference-based model or strategy giving decision. additional finding UGAMB was not mediated recipient willing accept provided support model. Using psychological measure cognitive control, received through conceptual replication previous control intuitive drive prosociality dictator game, rather mind reading responsible difference between two games.