CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PROPERTY CLAIMS IN A DYNAMIC WORLD

作者: DANIEL W. BROMLEY

DOI: 10.1111/J.1465-7287.1997.TB00488.X

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摘要: I. INTRODUCTION In their book The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy, Brennan and Buchanan (1985, p. 2) note, "If rules influence outcomes, if some outcomes are 'better' than others, it follows that to the extent can be chosen, study analysis comparative institutions become proper objects our attention." popularity game theory in economics is strong evidence (rules) matter; for what a but individual choice embedded structure working define domains open economic agents? And as (institutions) must now accorded central place theory. That said, question turns which pertinent particular activities. Rules contract, bankruptcy, credit address transactional insecurity, while property possessional insecurity. Societies choose situate different types at levels recognition differential importance going concern called nation-state. We might think constitutional political economy concerning very highest level society. contrast, statute law administrative occupy lower legal hierarchy. One aspect this location concerns ease with they may changed. Administrative changed quite easily, only great difficulty. interest rule structures thought signals - indicate choice, new signal existing have been problem economist how about (rules). Our maximizing models work best when fixed exogenously determined. However, all societies allow change, recognizing "too much" change will confound expectations. Property rights represent set do not then owners should receive compensation. But course even considerably, compensation has always forthcoming. At one time, slaves were private owners, wives considered husbands. These changes presumed unaccompanied by American Constitution contains "property clause" form Fifth Amendment declares, general terms, taken public use without payment just owner. Here system governance. reason obvious. First, prevents government entities from taking arbitrary capricious action against assets citizenry. Second, forces governments pay say need carry out several functions. Finally, institutional arrangement ensures no single person made bear cost necessary functions society; spreads costs among taxpayers jurisdiction. There excellent books on issues associated takings (Fischel, 1995; Knetsch, 1983; Miceli Segerson, 1996). important decisions support strict interpretation (Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, Lucas South Carolina Coastal Council, Nollan California Commission). Yet, number U.S. Supreme Court (and few state supreme courts) pertaining land find otherwise (Just Marinette County, Keystone Bituminous Ass 'n DeBenedictus, Miller et al. Schoene, Penn Central Transportation New York City, Babbitt …

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