What Happens to CEOs After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives

作者: James A. Brickley , Jeffrey L. Coles , James S. Linck

DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.567164

关键词:

摘要: This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that retired CEO serves his own two years after departure, as well serving an outside director other boards, are positively and strongly related to performance while CEO. Retention CEO's depends primarily stock returns, service boards is better explained by accounting returns. The also suggests firms consider ability in choosing members.

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