Profit Regulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation
作者： William P. Rogerson
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摘要: This paper argues that regulatory institutions in defense procurement are (and necessarily must be) organized to create prizes for innovation the form of positive economic profit on production contracts. has a number important policy implications. The values 12 major aerospace projects estimated using stock market data and shown be large.
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