Stable Group Purchasing Organizations

摘要: In this paper, we study the stability of Group Purchasing Organizations (GPOs). GPOs exist in several sectors and benefit its members through quantity discounts negotiation power when dealing with suppliers. However, despite obvious benefits, suffer from member dissatisfaction due to unfair allocations accrued savings among members. We first explore benefits allocation rules that are commonly reported as being used practice. characterize stable coalitional outcomes these provide conditions under which grand coalition emerges a tenable outcome. These somewhat restrictive. then propose an mechanism based on marginal value member's contribution find leads many scenarios interest. analysis, look at discount schedules encompass large class practical analyze cases purchasing requirements both exogenous well endogenous. use concept allows for players be farsighted, i.e., will consider possibility once they act (say by causing defection), another may react, third might turn so on, nullifying their original advantage making initial move.