Always Vote for Principle, Though You May Vote Alone: Explaining United States Political Support for Multilateral Development Loans
作者： Jonathan R. Strand , Tina M. Zappile
DOI: 10.1016/J.WORLDDEV.2015.02.013
关键词:
摘要: Summary What motivates the U.S. when casting votes and to what degree does its formal influence matter in final outcomes multilateral development banks? We first assess of on decisions find that 64% projects lacking support were nevertheless approved, suggesting is not as strong previously thought. then test several hypotheses explaining how MDBs. recipient need strongly related some evidence for both economic political factors, such trade relations human rights.
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