Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

作者: Lilia Cavallari

DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.016

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摘要: Abstract This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in model of strategic wage bargaining la Lippi (2003) . It shows that an optimal can be implemented through appropriately defined inflation target.

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