Understanding the contract structure for mango and empirical analysis of its determinants

作者: Jabir Ali , Sushil Kumar

DOI: 10.1108/BFJ-12-2014-0435

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摘要: Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the structure contractual arrangements in mango orchards and factors affecting contract design India. Design/methodology/approach study based on personal structured questionnaire survey 83 contractors one major growing areas A snowball sampling approach was adopted select suitable respondents for study. Descriptive statistics have been computed understand contractor’s response attributes. Factor analysis used categorize contractors’ responses various attributes contract. Further, a logistic regression model has developed determine decisions. Findings identifies nine aspects contracting covering orchard owner, management characteristics. assess decision time ente...

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