Tax Compliance and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution

作者: Steven Klepper , Daniel Nagin

DOI: 10.2307/3053715

关键词:

摘要: In this paper we use a survey concerning hypothetical taxpayer to analyze how certain features of the enforcement tax laws shape perceptions risks detection and penalties for noncompliance. We also examine effects these on intended noncompliance behavior. Our findings provide strong support various hypotheses effect process perceptions. find, in contrast prior results, that perceived risk criminal prosecution appears act as powerful deterrent explain why earlier studies might have failed detect role severity punishment.

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