作者: Angela Zottarel , Daniele Venturi , Jesper Buus Nielsen
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摘要: We revisit the context of leakage-tolerant interactive protocols as defined by Bitanski, Canetti and Halevi (TCC 2012). Our contributions can be summarized follows: For purpose secure message transmission, any encryption protocol with spaceM secret key spaceSK tolerating poly-logarithmic leakage on state receiver must satisfyjSKj (1 )jMj, for every 0 < 1, ifjSKj =jMj, then scheme use a fresh pair to encrypt each message. More generally, we show that anyn party tolerates poly(log ) bits from one at end execution, if only has passive adaptive security against an corruption execution. This shows soon little is tolerated, needs full security. All our results based assumption collision-resistant function ensembles exist.