Decoupling Economic Rights from Voting Rights: A Threat to the Traditional Corporate Governance Paradigm
作者： Klaas Vanneste
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752914001037
关键词:
摘要: The traditional legal and economic theory of the company is based on foundational understanding that equity ownership a bundle ‘cash flow rights’ ‘voting rights’. However, this assumption no longer adequate in today’s financial reality.
springer.com
sci-hub.se 参考文章(39)
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