Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness

作者: Johannes Roessler

DOI: 10.1007/S13164-015-0267-Y

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摘要: This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand relation between inner speech and knowledge one’s own thoughts. My aim here probe challenge popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our thoughts by ‘overhearing silent monologues’, sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired Ryle’s lesser-known discussion thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme whether, Ryle apparently thought, need different accounts epistemology thinking, corresponding distinction with respect which are active vs passive. I suggest should be skeptical about assumption there single here. There number interesting ways in can involve passivity, but they provide no support for ‘bifurcationist’ approach thinking.

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