A Comparative Analysis of Reverse Majority Voting: The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the EU Anti-Dumping Policy and the Reinforced SGP and Fiscal Compact

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DOI: 10.2139/SSRN.2202787

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摘要: The reinforced Stability and Growth Pact entered into force in December 2011 with a new set of rules for economic fiscal surveillance the EU Member States. To strengthen effective enforcement SGP introduced policy innovation reverse qualified majority voting Council. Under European Commission can impose sanction on State unless Council votes against within specified period. This paper discusses motivation impact rule decision-making It presents comparative analysis three cases where different types have been introduced, i.e. dispute settlement mechanism World Trade Organisation, trade defence Fiscal Compact. comparison demonstrates that considerably lowers threshold to pass proposals rendering their adoption almost automatic Ministers. As result, increases discretion executive relative legislative power. Moreover, evidence from WTO’s EU’s antidumping suggests automaticity is also likely change balance between rule- political-based area budgetary policy. These findings chime growing role majority-based an enlarged 27 However, highlight potential trade-off capacity legitimacy particularly considered be traditionally part States’ national sovereignty.

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