On the Privacy of Peer-Assisted Distribution of Security Patches

摘要: When a host discovers that it has software vulnerability is susceptible to an attack, the needs obtain and install patch. Because centralized distribution of patches may not scale well, peer-to-peer (P2P) approaches have recently been suggested. There is, however, serious privacy problem with peer-assisted patch distribution: when peer A requests from another B, announces B its vulnerability, which can exploit instead providing Through analytical modeling simulation, we show large majority vulnerable hosts will typically become compromised basic design for peer- assisted distribution. We then study effectiveness two different in countering this problem. The first approach utilizes special-purpose nodes, referred as honeypots, discover blacklist malicious peers listening hosts. In second approach, are requested through anonymizing network, hiding identities peers. Using models that, honeypots do completely solve problem; contrast, network turns out be more suitable security