Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand
作者： Alex Gershkov , Benny Moldovanu , Philipp Strack
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摘要: A designer allocates several indivisible objects to a stream of randomly arriving agents. The long-lived agents are privately informed about their value for an object, and arrival time the market. learns future arrivals from past arrivals, while strategically choose when make themselves available trade. We characterize revenue maximizing direct mechanism offer simple indirect that captures substantial part revenues mechanism.
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