作者: Marc Joye , Tancrède Lepoint
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_25
关键词:
摘要: In 1998, Boneh, Durfee and Frankel described several attacks against RSA enabling an attacker given a fraction of the bits private exponent d to recover all d. These were later improved extended in various ways. They however always consider that is smaller than modulus N. When it comes implementation, can be enlarged value larger N so as improve performance (by lowering its Hamming weight) or increase security preventing certain side-channel attacks). This paper studies this setting quantifies number required mount practical partial key exposure attacks. Both cases known most significant (MSBs) least (LSBs) are analyzed. Our results based on Coppersmith's heuristic methods validated by experiments run through SAGE computer-algebra system.